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Abstract
We investigate the impact of papal visits to Italian provinces on abortions from 1979
to 2012. Using administrative data, we find a 10–20% decrease in the number of
abortions that commences in the 3rd month and persists until the 14th month after the
visits. However, we find no significant change in the number of live births. A decline
in unintended pregnancies best explains our results. Papal visits generate intense local
media coverage, and likely make salient the Catholic Church’s stance against abor-
tions. We show that papal visits lead to increased church attendance, and that the
decline in abortions is greater when the Pope mentions abortion in his speeches.
Keywords Abortion · Religion · Pope · Culture · Fertility
JEL Classiﬁcation D91 · J13 · Z12
1 Introduction
Through history, religion has shaped societies and has been, and inmany cases contin-
ues to be, a key factor in how people make major life choices. The economics of reli-
gion is a young but fast-growing field of research that employs economic theory and
econometric techniques to better understand the interaction between religion and soci-
ety (Iannaccone 1998; McCleary and Barro 2006; Iyer 2016). In this paper, we inves-
tigate the link between religion and abortions. Each day, approximately 153,000 preg-
nancies are terminated around the world (Sedgh et al. 2016). While access to abortion
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has become more widely available in an increasing number of countries, abortion
remains a controversial procedure. In many countries, women who abort face reli-
gious sanctions, legal restrictions and hostile social norms (Norris et al. 2011). The
decision to undergo an abortion is often associated with considerable stress and
anxiety. For example, Coleman et al. (2009) show that women who abort are at
a higher risk of a variety of mental health problems, including anxiety, mood and
substance abuse disorders, when compared with women without a history of abortion.
We measure the causal impact of papal visits to Italian provinces between 1979
and 2012 on the number of abortions. Our choice to focus on Italy is motivated by
three factors. First, Italy is predominantly Catholic and the Pope is the emblem of
Catholic doctrine. Second, due to the geographical proximity of the Vatican, Italy is
the country with the highest number of papal visits, viz. 129 in our sample period,
increasing the statistical power of our research design. Finally, since 1979, the Italian
National Institute of Statistics has collected information on all abortions in Italy with
a high detail of geographical identification, allowing us to construct a monthly panel
of abortion counts at the provincial level.
We employ an event study methodology to measure the impact of a papal visit to
an Italian province. Our main result is a large and statistically significant drop in the
number of abortions starting from the 3rd month after a papal visit and persisting
until about the 14th month. Specifically, we measure a decline in monthly abortion
counts that ranges from about 10 to 20%. Ceteris paribus, a decline in abortions
should be accompanied by a subsequent spike in live births. However, we fail to
detect a significant increase in births after the papal visit. This is surprising for at
least two reasons. First, as we detail later, a back of the envelope calculation predicts
that, if there is no change in the number of pregnancies, live births should increase
by about 3.7% 6 to 7 months after the decline in abortions. Our null result on the
number of births is rather precise; the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval
is about 1.2%. Second, independently of the effect on abortions, papal visits would
be expected to boost fertility in the short run through an increase in desired fertility
or reduced contraceptive usage. Indeed, Bassi and Rasul (2017) document a spike in
births in Brazil 9 months after the papal visit in 1992.
Why would papal visits lead to a drop in abortions? Catholic Church doctrine
strongly condemns deliberate termination of pregnancy. According to the Donum
Vitae:
“Human life is sacred because from its beginning it involves the creative action
of God and it remains for ever in a special relationship with the Creator, who
is its sole end. God alone is the Lord of life from its beginning until its end: no
one can under any circumstance claim for himself the right directly to destroy
an innocent human being” (Ratzinger 1987).
Papal visits can heighten the stigma attached to abortion, leading to both direct
and indirect effects on the number of abortions. By direct effect, we mean a reduced
probability of abortion, conditional on becoming unintentionally pregnant. This can
be mediated through a drop in the demand for and in the supply of abortions.
Women may be more reluctant to abort. Alternatively, stigma could drive women
to opt for “back-street” abortions to keep the procedure secret, which would cause
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under-reporting. Abortion providers may also become more reluctant to do the pro-
cedure unless medically necessary. In contrast, the indirect effect is a reduction in
the number of abortions due to a decrease in the number of unintended pregnancies
if women choose more abstinence or use more contraception.1
The intuition of the indirect effect is readily confirmed in a simple model of con-
traceptive usage that builds on Levine (2004). In this model, women are forward
looking and fully informed of their personal costs of abortion vs. birth in the case of
an unintended pregnancy. They choose an optimal level of contraception, which can
include abstinence. Papal visits increase the perceived cost of abortion. The model
predicts that women respond by increasing contraceptive usage, thereby reducing the
number of unintended pregnancies, which in turn reduces the number of abortions.
For two main reasons, we argue that it is the indirect effect rather than the direct
effects that drive our results. First, the direct effects should show up as a decline in
abortions that is contemporaneous with the papal visit. There is no such contempo-
raneous drop. In contrast, if there is a decline in unintended pregnancies that begins
with a papal visit, it would manifest itself with a decrease in abortions 2–3 months
after the papal visit since pregnancies are typically detected 6–8 weeks after con-
ception.2 Second, as noted already, we find no significant increase in births after the
papal visit. If there are fewer abortions, births must mechanically increase unless the
number of pregnancies is also falling.3
The proximate causes of a fall in unintended pregnancies could be increased absti-
nence, or alternatively, increased usage of contraceptives during intercourse. Since
the Catholic Church frowns upon sexual relations unless in the context of procre-
ation, that could also directly increase abstinence. Women may also opt for more use
of contraceptives, although that can pose a dilemma since the Catholic Church has
traditionally opposed contraception. It is conceivable that some women decide that
contraception is the “lesser of two evils”.
We furnish supporting evidence that papal visits make the Catholic doctrine highly
salient and increase the perceived cost of abortion. While one might think that Ital-
ians are “accustomed” to the papal presence, as he lives in Rome and often visits
Italian provinces, we document that papal visits within Italy dominate local media
coverage and generate considerable excitement among the local clergy and the popu-
lation alike. Furthermore, the impact on abortions appears to be larger when the Pope
refers to abortion in his speeches and when he engages more intensively with the
public. We also find that the visits result in higher religiosity in the local population
as proxied by church attendance.
This paper contributes to a number of different literatures. First, we shed additional
light on the determinants of abortion. The economic literature on abortions can be
1Henceforth, when we mention women, we imply women or couples as the relevant decisions on engaging
in sexual intercourse, using contraception, or deciding to abort are likely to involve not just the woman but
also her partner.
2The vast majority of voluntary terminations of pregnancy occur in the second or third month.
3A significant fraction of unintended pregnancies lead to live births. Singh et al. (2010) estimate that in
2008 in Southern Europe, 39% of all pregnancies were unintended. Of these, just over 40% were aborted.
About 48% were carried to term and resulted in live births. The remaining ended as miscarriages.
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traced back to seminal work by Becker (1991) and Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983).
They model children as an investment producing benefits over time. Contraception
and abortion are seen as methods for achieving the number of children desired by
the household. Several studies have explored how the demand for abortion responds
to changes in public policies. Blank et al. (1996) and Levine et al. (1996) show that
the enactment of restrictions on Medicaid funding is correlated with a decline in
abortion rates in the USA. Joyce and Kaestner (1996) show that parental involvement
laws have no impact on the probability of abortion for minors in the USA, with the
only exception of South Carolina, where a negative and statistically significant effect
is found for 16-year-old non-Blacks. Levine (2003) finds that parental involvement
laws reduce abortion rates for younger teens, but not for older teens or adult women.
Abramowitz (2018) finds that the provision of the Affordable Care Act for young
adults, a health insurance reform enacted in the USA in 2010, causes a decrease in
the probability of childbirth and in the abortion rate. A new stream of research has
started to investigate the causal effects of “supply-side” policies that target abortion
facilities Joyce (2011). Grossman et al. (2017) find that, among Texas counties with
no abortion provider in 2014, larger increases in the distance to the nearest provider
between 2012 and 2014 are associated with larger decreases in abortions. Lindo et al.
(2017) find a large and non-linear reduction in abortion rates in response to increased
distance to clinics from abortion clinic closures in Texas; they also find a substantial
negative effect from increased congestion at the surviving clinics.
Second, we add to the strand of literature in the economics of religion that aims
to pin down the causal effects of religion on important socio-economic outcomes.
For example, a number of recent papers have exploited the exogenous timing of
Ramadan-induced fasting to study effects on educational, health and labour mar-
ket outcomes (Almond and Mazumder 2011; Oosterbeek and van der Klaauw 2013;
Majid 2015). Clingingsmith et al. (2009) exploit the lottery-based allocation of Hajj
visas in Pakistan to identify the impact of Hajj on religiosity and social attitudes. In
an experimental study, Benjamin et al. (2016) randomly prime subjects to make their
religious identity salient and find that this causes subjects to identify more closely
with their religion, and in turn affects their economic choices. Our paper is closely
related to a recent paper by Bassi and Rasul (2017) on the effect of the 1991 papal
visit on fertility-related beliefs and behaviour in Brazil. The authors report a signifi-
cant increase in the hazard rate for births 9 months post-visit. We complement Bassi
and Rasul (2017) using administrative records to study the impact of papal visits on
abortion and to a lesser extent births. To the best of our knowledge, no study before
has sought to measure the effect of heightened religious sentiment on the number
of abortions or used administrative data to precisely estimate the effect of the papal
visits on the number of births.
Finally and more broadly, the paper contributes to a growing literature focused
on the impact of role models on behaviour. Beaman et al. (2009) and Beaman et al.
(2012) show that exposure to a female politician reduces gender stereotypes and
influences adolescent girls’ career aspirations and educational attainment. DellaVi-
gna (2010) uses an event study methodology to explore how Obama’s election affects
racial discrimination against Blacks and economic outcomes for Blacks by changing
perceptions of Blacks. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) analyse how individual managers
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affect corporate behaviour and performance. Jones and Olken (2005) investigate the
impact of national leaders on economic growth. Stroebel and van Benthem (2012) use
the appointment of local bishops in Kenya to study the impact of church authorities’
teaching on sexual behaviour.
The paper is organised as follows. We present the institutional setting in Section 2.
In Section 3, we describe the data on abortion and the papal visits. Next in Section 4,
we sketch a simple model of contraceptive usage, and spell out the predictions for
the number of unintended pregnancies, abortions and live births in response to a
change in the perceived cost of abortion. Regression results for the number of abor-
tions and live births are presented in Section 5. In Section 6, we investigate plausible
mechanisms that could be driving the results. In particular, we show that papal vis-
its within Italy generate widespread coverage in local media, there appears to be an
increase in religiosity as measured by church attendance, and the measured decline
in abortion is greater during visits where the Pope mentions abortion. We discuss and
interpret our findings in Section 7. We also show that the timing of papal visits is not
driven by short-run pre-existing province-level trends, bolstering the case for a causal
interpretation of our results. Finally, we conclude in Section 8.
2 Institutional setting
Historically, the Catholic Church has exerted a strong influence on the Italian cul-
ture. For example, the current Italian education system requires the teaching of the
Catholic religion in all schools below the university level due to the Lateran Treaties,
an agreement between the Italian Kingdom and the Holy See signed by Mussolini
during the fascist regime. Since the institutional referendum in 1946, in which the
Italian population voted to abolish the monarchy, the Vatican tried to actively influ-
ence the political course of the republic. For example, in 1948, the Church supported
the Christian Democratic party against the Communist Party presenting the election
as a conflict between good and evil.
In 1974, the Italian Bishop Conference strongly supported the initiative in favour
of the promotion of the referendum repealing the law on divorce passed in 1970.4
Similarly, after an abortion bill became law in 1978, the Pope and the Italian Bishops’
Conference promoted the attempt to restrict abortion in the referendum proposed by
the right-to-life movement in 1981.
Vezzoni and Biolcati-Rinaldi (2015) have documented a declining trend in reli-
giosity in Italy since the late 1960s until 2010, in spite of a period of stability in the
1980s and 1990s. Nonetheless, Italy today remains a predominantly Catholic country;
Catholics comprised 71% of the population in 2016 (Eurispes 2016).
According to the Catholic doctrine, family represents the original cell of social
life, where individuals learn moral values from childhood. The creation of the nuclear
family cannot prescind frommarriage, seen as a covenant linking a man and a woman
4See for instance (Wertman 1982) who reports that the Italian Bishops’ Conference issued a document
arguing that opting for divorce would be an act of disobedience for Catholics.
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for the rest of their lives. Sexuality is only admitted within the wedlock, and if aimed
at fulfilling the twofold obligation of the “good of the spouses” and the transmission
of life.5 In the light of this perception adopted by the Church, divorces, the recourse
to sterilisation, and the use of contraceptives and abortion are viewed as “a sign of
the refusal that man gives to the love of God” (John Paul II 1981). Even with the
decline in religiosity, Catholic doctrine still shapes popular opinion on abortion. In
a survey from year 2016, 83.2% of the people interviewed report to be in favour of
the abortion in case of danger for the mother while only the 18.6% of people think
abortion is acceptable if a woman does not want to have children (Eurispes 2016).
Voluntary pregnancy termination in Italy became legal in May 1978, with the
approval of the Law 194/78 by the Italian Parliament. Abortions are performed free-
of-charge in public hospitals or for a fee in private facilities authorised by the regional
health authorities. Women at least 18 years old can request a termination of pregnancy
during the first 90 days for health, economic or social reasons. For women below
18, permission must be sought from their legal guardian or, in the event of refusal, a
judge may intervene with an injunction, within 5 days of the request if there are suf-
ficient legal reasons. Abortions are also allowed in the second and third trimesters of
the pregnancy if the life of the woman would be at risk if the pregnancy is carried to
term or the foetus presents genetic malformations which would expose the mother to
a risk of serious psychological or physical consequences.
After a woman obtains the medical authorisation, a period of 7 days has to occur
before the date of the abortion operation, unless an immediate intervention is required
due to the presence of risks for the woman’s health conditions. The abortion operation
is generally performed 8 to 30 days after a woman obtains the medical authorisation.
During the Question Time on 19 April 2017, the Minister of Health Beatrice Loren-
zin claimed that 65.3% of voluntary pregnancy terminations are performed within
14 days from medical authorisation (Ministry of Health 2017).
Figure 1 compares the trend in the abortion rate, defined as the number of abor-
tions per 1000 women aged 15–44, in Italy and the USA. While the rate in Italy is
lower, it trends similarly except for a surge after legalisation in 1978.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
From 1979 to 2012, John Paul II and Benedict XVI made 129 official visits to 85
provinces within Italy.6 We generate an event binary indicator mapping each town
visited by the Pope in a given quarter of year to the corresponding province.7 Due to
5See, for example, the Catechism of the Catholic Church (n.d.) at the following link: http://www.vatican.
va/archive/ccc css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a6.htm.
6Since the change in the number of provinces over time could influence our results, as a robustness test
we have analysed the impact of the papal visits on abortions, excluding the new provinces and the pre-
existing ones affected by the creation of the new administrative bodies. The outcome, available upon
request, confirms the main results presented in Section 5.
7Italian provinces are administrative units between a municipality and a region, corresponding to NUTS-
3 regions according to the European Union classification. Several municipalities form a province while
several provinces form a region (Valle d’Aosta is the sole exception, since the provincial functions are
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Fig. 1 Yearly abortion rate in Italy and the USA. The data on Italy are provided by ISTAT. The data for the
USA are provided by the Johnston’s archive (http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/abortion/index.html)
the presence of multiple destinations within the same visit, we identify 173 episodes
(called Pope Events hereafter) in which the Italian provinces were visited by the Pope
in a given quarter of year.
The duration of the papal visits can vary from a single to multiple days. While
there is no one standardised program across visits, they do share some common
features. For example, after the Pope is welcomed by the delegates of the political
institutions and the dioceses hosting the event, the Pope typically holds an open mass
in public. The religious ceremony is generally followed by meetings with specific
subgroups of the local population, such as the local youth, or by visits to hospitals
and penitentiaries. Unlike the international visits, which hold an in-flight question-
and-answer session with the press onboard the plane, in general the Pope does not
address the local media directly, even though journalists are allowed to cover papal
activities during the visit.
Summary statistics on the events are reported in Table 1; on average, the Pope
visited just over 5 provinces in a year. The last two columns in Table 1 offer a com-
parison between John Paul II’s papacy (column 2) and Benedict XVI’s one (column
3). It is worth noting that the number of provinces visited per year by Pope John Paul
II is on average higher than Benedict XVI’s visits, reflecting John Paul’s proverbial
exercised by the region). Provinces fulfil three main functions, i.e. local planning and zoning, provision of
local police and fire services and, finally, transportation regulation such as car registration or maintenance
of local roads. In 2012, there were 110 provinces, even though the number has been steadily growing in
recent years.
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Table 1 Papal visits
(1) (2) (3)
All Visits John Paul II Benedict XVI
1979–2012 1979–2004 2005–2012
No. of papal visits 129 100 29
No. of pope events 173 141 32
No. of provinces visited 85 82 26
Pope events/year 5.08 5.42 4
No. of provinces 110 103 110
Authors’ calculations
higher propensity to travel; he was also known as the Globetrotter Pope or Voyager
Pope (Danesi n.d.). The distribution of events across provinces over the study period
is shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 Papal visits to the Italian provinces
Papal visits and abortions: evidence from Italy
Following the legalisation of abortion in Italy, the data on induced abortions per-
formed in public and private clinics certified and authorised by the Italian regions are
provided since 1979 by the Italian National Institute of Statistics together with the
Italian regions and the Ministry of Health. The survey requires the doctor performing
the termination of pregnancy to collect important information on the socio-economic
status of the woman such as date and place of birth, place of residence, marital status,
educational level and work status. Information on the operation are also provided,
such as date of pregnancy interruption, province of the operation, length of stay in
hospital and presence of complications.
The micro-data on abortions and on live births are securely maintained on the
servers of the Italian National Institute of Statistics. For reasons of confidentiality,
researchers are not permitted to copy and move the data elsewhere. All analysis must
be conducted on-site with prior approval. All analytical results such as notes, tables,
and figures are subject to stringent scrutiny before approval for release.
In Table 2, we present summary statistics on abortions stratified by age, the
education level and marital status of women. Unsurprisingly, the abortion ratio, con-
ventionally defined as a/b where a and b are the counts of voluntary abortions and
Table 2 Abortions by women’s demographics
(1) (2)
Abortions Abortion ratio (%)
Panel A - Age category
Not reported 12,100 10.71
Age≤ 19 460,932 99.02
20 ≤Age≤ 24 993,223 32.72
25 ≤Age≤ 29 1,128,878 20.52
30 ≤Age≤ 34 1,121,674 21.39
35 ≤Age≤ 39 926,822 34.96
Age≥ 40 490,988 82.37
Panel B - Education Lv.
Not reported 280,175 −
Elementary school 1,345,696 −
Lower secondary school 2,172,676 −
Upper secondary school 1,188,268 −
Higher education 147,802 −
Panel C - Marital status
Unmarried 2,125,774 120.53
Married 3, 008, 843 19.18
N 5,134,617 29.16
Column 1 reports the number of abortions from 1979 to 2012 for each subcategory. Column 2 displays the
abortion ratio defined as abortions/births
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live births, respectively, is the highest for teenagers (99.02%) and unmarried women
(120%). Presumably, there is a large overlap between the two groups. The abortion
ratio is also high for women aged 40 years or more, presumably on medical grounds
since pregnancies tend to be riskier for older women. While the abortion ratio is
much higher for unmarried women, married women account for the majority (about
59%) of abortions. Also, women who have completed lower secondary school educa-
tion, corresponding to 8 years of education including elementary school, account for
almost 43% of all abortions. The abortion ratio cannot be calculated by educational
attainment since this information is not available for mothers due to changes in data
collection on births starting from 1999.
In Fig. 3, we present the number of yearly abortions for the period 1979–2012 at
the national level. The strong increase in the early 1980s in response to the legali-
sation of abortion has been followed by a steady decrease over time. In Fig. 4, we
plot the trend in annual number of live births for the same period. The plot docu-
ments the well-known decline in Italian fertility through the 1980s and 1990s. The
sharp dip in 1997–1998 is an artefact of under-reporting of births. A new law in
1997 aimed at administrative simplification dramatically changed the data collection
process, allowing parents to declare live births not only at the registers of the munic-
ipality where the birth event took place but also at the registers of the municipality
where parents normally resided. The immediate application of this law, in the middle
of 1997, caused a period of strong uncertainty which resulted in the under-reporting
of live births for the years 1997–1998. We exclude those two years when we analyse
the impact of papal visits on live births.
Comparing Figs. 3 and 4 provides an indication of the level and trend in the
abortion ratio—it declines from over 35% in the early 1980s to about 20% by 2012.
Fig. 3 Annual abortions in Italy (in thousands). The data on the annual number of abortions are provided
by ISTAT
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Fig. 4 Annual births in Italy (in thousands). The data on the annual number of births are provided by
ISTAT
In order to study the impact of the visits of the Pope to the Italian provinces, we
aggregate the number of abortions and births at the province–month (or province–
quarter) level. Summary statistics of those counts are reported in Table 3.
Table 3 Abortions and births
(1) (2)
Province–month Province–quarter
Panel A
No. of abortions 127.25 381.75
(187.25) (557.48)
N 40,470 13,490
Panel B
No. of births 459.30 1,364.81
(570.38) (1, 684.02)
N 37,998 12,666
The reported statistics are the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of the number of abortions
(Panel A) or births (Panel B) at the province–month (column 1) or province–quarter (column 2) level
for the years 1979 to 2012. The data for births exclude the years 1997 and 1998 since there was under-
reporting in those years due to the application of a new law on administrative simplification on birth
registration which caused a period of uncertainty
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4 Theoretical framework
Papal visits plausibly make salient and heighten the stigma attached to abortion. This
can affect the number of abortions through direct and indirect effects. The direct
effect is the reduced probability of a woman getting an abortion, conditional on find-
ing herself with an unintended pregnancy. This effect can work through reduced
demand and/or supply. On the demand side, women may be less willing to abort.
Alternatively (or additionally) there may be a constriction in supply, i.e. an increased
reluctance of abortion providers to do the procedure. The direct effect predicts that
abortions would start decreasing contemporaneously with the visit, and the number
of live births would increase starting 6 to 7 months after the visit.8
The indirect effect is a behavioural change that reduces the probability of an
unintended pregnancy. Specifically, women may choose to increase the use of
contraceptives (possibly including more abstinence) to guard against unintended
pregnancies, so that they do not have to face the dilemma of abortion.9
Most pregnancies are detected 6 to 8 weeks after conception, and it presumably
takes another 2–3 weeks to decide and schedule an abortion. Therefore, a decline
in unintended pregnancies that starts contemporaneously with the papal visit would
show up as a decline in abortions about 2–3 months later. It is not immediately obvi-
ous whether the indirect effect causes births to increase or decrease. On one hand,
fewer unintended pregnancies should reduce the number of births, given a fixed frac-
tion of such pregnancies being aborted. On the other hand, births could increase if
unintended pregnancies are aborted at a lower rate.
To formalise our intuition about the indirect effect, we build on the discussion
in Levine (2004) to develop a simple model of contraception. Women who are not
planning to have a baby choose c, a measure of contraceptive intensity, i.e. the level
of precaution exercised to prevent conception. Note that increased abstinence is also
a form of contraception. This is costly; let f (c) be the cost of contraceptive intensity
with f ′ > 0.
Contraception is not completely effective; let p(c) be the probability that the
woman conceives as a function of c. Obviously, p′ < 0.
If the woman conceives, she has to decide whether to abort or have the baby.
Each woman is denoted by a type {a, b} where a and b are the woman-specific
costs of aborting and having a baby, respectively. We assume perfect foresight, i.e.
each woman correctly perceives these costs before she pick c. Then, if the woman
conceives, she aborts if a < b, else she decides to have the baby.
A woman picks c to minimise f (c) + p(c)min{a, b}.
8A woman who is 2 months pregnant at the time of the visit, and decides against abortion because of the
visit, will give birth 7 months after the visit.
9Abortions are most likely to occur in the case of unintended pregnancies. They could also occur in planned
pregnancies on medical grounds or if the woman or couple changes its mind. However, most abortions
are related to unintended pregnancies. For instance, Finer and Henshaw (2006) indicate that less than 5%
of abortions in the USA were were intended pregnancies at the time of conception. Likewise, Schu¨nmann
and Glasier (2006) find that 92% of women undergoing an abortion operation in Scotland did not plan
their pregnancy.
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We analyse the impact of an increase in the perceived cost of abortion a1 > a for
three relevant types of women.
Type I (never-aborters): b < a
Such women will pick c to minimise f (c) + p(c)b =⇒ f ′(c∗) = −p′(c∗)b. If
the woman conceives, she will opt to give birth. Importantly, if there is an increase
in the cost of abortion, this will not affect c∗. For such women, there is no effect on
either the number of abortions (0 before and after) or the number of births.
Type II (always-aborters): a < a1 < b
Before the change in cost of abortion, such women pick c to minimise f (c) +
p(c)a =⇒ f ′(c∗) = −p′(c∗)a. If the woman conceives, she will abort. In this
case, an increase in the cost of abortion will affect c∗, although it will not change the
decision to abort if contraception fails.
The implicit function theorem yields the direction of change in c∗:
f ′(c) = −p′(c)a
f ”(c)
∂c
∂a
= −p′(c) − p′′(c)a ∂c
∂a
∂c
∂a
= −p
′(c)
f ′′(c) + p′′(c)a
The numerator is positive. The denominator is also positive as it is the second-
order condition for an interior solution to the minimisation problem. Thus, c∗
increases and p decreases.10
This reduces number of unintended pregnancies and the number of abortions.
There is no effect on the number of births which stay 0 before and after.
Type III (switchers): a < b < a1
Such women will switch from aborting to having a baby when the cost of abor-
tion rises. However, the optimal c will also change. Since the cost of pregnancy
has increased, the argument presented in case II holds in this case as well, and c∗
increases and thus p decreases. The number of unintended pregnancies will fall. But
these pregnancies will no longer be aborted. Therefore, there will be an unambiguous
decrease in the number of abortions and an increase in the number of births.
10We can also show that c∗ is weakly increasing in the cost of abortion a under weaker conditions (Topkis
1978). Define the woman’s objective function: F(c, a) = f (c) + p(c)min{a, b}. We need to show that
for any c1 > c and any a1 > a that:
F(c1, a1) − F(c, a1) ≤ F(c1, a) − F(c, a)
=⇒ [p(c1) − p(c)]min{a1, b} ≤ [p(c1) − p(c)]min{a, b}.
Since p(c1) ≤ p(c) and min(.) is an increasing function, the above is always true. Notice we made no
assumptions about f . However, unless one assumes that f and p are strictly convex, the argmin (set of
optimal c) need not be unique. In that case, the above condition guarantees that the argmin correspondence
increases in a with respect to the “strong set order”. Intuitively, if a1 > a, then the lower (upper) bound of
argmin at a1 is higher that the lower (upper) bound of argmin at a (the interval shifts to the right).
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Table 4 summarises the predicted impact of an increase in the cost of abortion
on contraceptive usage, and the number of unintended pregnancies, abortions and
births. Using available data, we can test the predictions of the model for the number
of abortions and births. The model’s predictions in the aggregate data depend upon
the distribution of types in the population. We do not directly observe the types.
But we know that in the absence of papal visits, a non-trivial fraction of unintended
pregnancies are aborted, i.e. a < b which implies that together, always-aborters
and switchers make up a non-trivial fraction of women. This simple model predicts
that an exogenous increase in the perceived cost of abortion reduces the number of
abortions, through increased contraception that decreases the number of unintended
pregnancies. Table 4 also suggests that whether we observe an increase in the number
of births depends on the proportion of switchers.
The assumption of perfect foresight is not critical for the prediction of a decline in
abortions. It is plausible that some women form naive priors about the costs of abor-
tion and birth, and update only when they get pregnant. The perceived costs determine
a woman’s choice of contraceptive usage; the updated costs post-pregnancy do not
factor in that decision. As long as the perceived a1 > a, the model predicts a decline
in abortions.
5 Regression results
5.1 Abortions
To study the impact of the papal visits to the Italian provinces on the number of
abortions, we estimate the following specification:
ln(np,q) = α+βprej
j=−2∑
j=−1
prej+βpostk
k=5∑
k=0
postk+θp+θy+
l=4∑
l=1
λl+γp×t+δp×t2+up,q
(1)
where np,q represents the number of abortions in province p in the quarter of year q;
prej are placebo dummy variables capturing any impact of the papal visits on abor-
tions in the two quarters prior to the visit; postk are post-event dummies enveloping
the Pope Event (post0 = 1) up to the fifth quarter after the papal visits in a given
province. θp and θy represent province and year fixed effects; λl are calendar quarter
Table 4 Impact of an increase in the cost of abortion
Case Δcontraception Δ(pregnancies) Δ(abortions) Δ(births)
I: b < a 0 0 0 0
II a < a1 < b + − − 0
III a < b < a1 + − − +
a, b: cost of abortion and birth respectively in the event of an unintended pregnancy; a1: heightened cost
of abortion due to papal visit
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dummy variables capturing possible seasonalities. γp×t and δp×t2, finally, represent
province specific yearly linear and quadratic trends, respectively. In the most rigor-
ous specification, we control for quarter-of-year fixed effects and province-specific
quarter-of-year linear and quadratic trends.
Table 5 shows the results for the number of abortions. We observe that the esti-
mates are stable across different specifications; reassuringly, the pre-event dummy
indicators are not statistically significant at any conventional level. Focusing on our
preferred specification that is also the most stringent one—column 4—we can see a
Table 5 The impact of the papal visits on abortions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(abortions)
pre2 − 0.020 − 0.022 − 0.017 − 0.018
(0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024)
pre1 0.003 0.002 −0.002 − 0.003
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
post0 − 0.009 − 0.013 − 0.008 − 0.013
(0.024) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018)
post1 − 0.108∗ − 0.113∗ − 0.103∗ − 0.107∗
(0.060) (0.057) (0.060) (0.057)
post2 − 0.141∗∗ − 0.146∗∗ − 0.138∗∗ − 0.140∗∗
(0.066) (0.063) (0.066) (0.063)
post3 − 0.166∗∗ − 0.167∗∗ − 0.171∗∗ − 0.174∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
post4 − 0.164∗∗ − 0.158∗∗ − 0.164∗∗ − 0.159∗∗
(0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077)
post5 − 0.040 − 0.033 − 0.038 − 0.028
(0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027)
N 12,720 12,720 12,720 12,720
R2 0.810 0.876 0.811 0.877
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes No No
Calendar quarter FE Yes Yes No No
Quarter FE No No Yes Yes
Prov. yearly trends No Yes No No
Prov. quarterly trends No No No Yes
Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the provincial level
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strong reduction in the number of abortions in the provinces visited by the Pope start-
ing from the first quarter after the papal visits. The size of the effect is substantial; it
varies between − 10% (post1) and − 17.4% (post3).11
We zoom in on the dynamics of the change in the number of abortions at the time
of the papal visit by estimating a version of Eq. 1 that uses monthly counts of abor-
tion. We include month and province fixed effects, and province-specific linear and
quadratic monthly trends. For ease of exposition, we present the relevant estimates
graphically for this and many of the subsequent regressions. In Fig. 5, we plot the
coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the monthly change in abortion counts
starting 4 months prior to the papal visit event, and all the way up to 16 months after.
The pre-event indicators are not statistically significant at any conventional level
and the size of the coefficients is close to 0. Month 0 corresponds to the month of
the visit and the coefficient is positive but small and statistically insignificant. The
coefficients for months 1 and 2 are negative but also very small and statistically
insignificant. The effects are much larger starting in the 3rd month and persist until
the 14th month following the visit, and they are almost always statistically significant,
ranging from about − 10% to almost − 20% in magnitude.12
Both the observed decrease in abortion and the timing of this effect (starts about
3 months after the visit) are consistent with the indirect effect discussed in Section 4.
Unintended pregnancies start to decline about the time of the visit and this decline
persists for almost 12 months. While a direct effect cannot be ruled out, the delayed
decline in abortion suggests that any direct effect plays a limited role.
5.2 Births
We use the survey on live births carried out by the Italian National Institute of
Statistics for the period 1979–2012, which collects information from the population
registers of the municipalities where the birth events occurred or where the parents
of the newborn normally reside, providing detailed information on the delivery of the
newborn as well as socio-demographic indicators of the parents. We aggregate the
number of live births at the province of birth-quarter of year level.
We estimate Eq. 1 with the log of province-level counts of live births each quarter
as the dependent variable.
Table 6 displays the results. Focusing on the most rigorous specification in col-
umn 4, we fail to find evidence of any significant change in the number of births.
That, in conjunction with the finding of a large decline in abortions reported in the
previous section, is additional evidence that the indirect effect dominates any direct
11A possible concern is the fact that women might seek an abortion operation in a province different from
the one visited by the Pope. However, this is unlikely to invalidate our results, as approximately 87% of
pregnancy terminations are performed in the women’s province of residence, as reported by the Minister
of Health Beatrice Lorenzin during her Question Time on 19 April 2017. For the sake of completeness we
have re-estimated Eq. 1 aggregating the number of abortions by the woman’s province of residence. The
results, available upon request, confirm the main findings presented in Table 5.
12To check how long the effect persists, we have estimated monthly specifications up to 24 months after
the visit, and the estimates are close to 0 and statistically insignificant starting from the 15th month.
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Fig. 5 Monthly leads and lags of impact on abortions
effect. To see this, assume that papal visits only have a direct effect of constrict-
ing abortion choices. Then, we can construct a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the
ceteris paribus increase in births. In Italy during this period, on average about 20%
of pregnancies were being aborted. A 15% decline in abortions implies that for every
100 pregnancies, an additional 0.15 × 20 = 3 babies would be carried to term. That
in turn maps to approximately 3.7% more births. In contrast, Table 6 shows that the
upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for the coefficients in the third and fourth
quarter is about 1.2%. In specifications using monthly counts of birth, we fail to find
any significant uptick in months 8, 9 or 10 following the papal visit; see Fig. 6 that
shows the monthly effects on births are close to 0 and statistically insignificant.
The indirect effect predicts that the number of births will increase if there is a
non-trivial fraction of type III, i.e. switchers in the population. The null finding on
births suggests that among women who usually opt to abort, i.e. always-aborters and
switchers, the latter make up only a small fraction (see Table 4).
6 Mechanisms
In this section, we provide evidence for a plausible mechanism for our findings: an
increase in religiosity that persists for several months. First, we present evidence
that even though the Pope resides within Italy, papal visits generate considerable
excitement and media coverage in the visited areas. We also show that the impact on
abortions is larger when the Pope explicitly talks about abortion during his visit, and
also when he engages with the public more intensively. Next, we study how religious
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Table 6 The impact of the papal visits on births
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(births)
pre2 0.003 − 0.003 0.002 − 0.004
(0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005)
pre1 − 0.006 − 0.010∗ − 0.007 − 0.010∗
(0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006)
post0 − 0.003 − 0.010∗ 0.001 − 0.007
(0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006)
post1 0.001 − 0.001 0.002 − 0.001
(0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
post2 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.000
(0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005)
post3 0.002 − 0.001 0.004 − 0.000
(0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005)
post4 0.001 − 0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
post5 − 0.008 − 0.003 − 0.007 − 0.003
(0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
N 11,896 11,896 11,896 11,896
R2 0.910 0.979 0.911 0.979
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes No No
Calendar quarter FE Yes Yes No No
Quarter FE No No Yes Yes
Prov. yearly trends No Yes No No
Prov. quarterly trends No No No Yes
Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the provincial level
attitudes change in response to the papal visits, and document an increase in church
attendance.
6.1 Salience of papal visits
Even though the Vatican is located within Italy, papal visits generate considerable
excitement within local clergy and population, and there is intense local media cov-
erage. We present two pieces of analyses that document the spike in media coverage
of the Pope by media in the visited provinces, relative to the rest.
In the first analysis, we randomly pick four papal visits, two from the north—
Verona (October 2006) and Brescia (November 2009)—and two from the south of
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Fig. 6 Monthly leads and lags of impact on births
Italy—Bari (February 1984) and Palermo (October 2010)—and, for each of them, we
count the number of articles dedicated to the Pope in (a) the local newspaper from the
province visited, (b) a non-local newspaper, i.e. a local newspaper from a randomly
selected province that was not visited and does not border the visited province and
(c) a national newspaper, in a 7-day window enveloping the event.13
In Table 7, we show that local newspapers pay much greater attention to the visit of
the Pope compared with other non-local or national newspapers. For instance, during
the week of the visit to Bari in 1980, the local newspaper carried 57 articles on the
Pope while the non-local and national newspapers carried only 2 each.
To give the reader a flavour of the type of coverage, Figs. 12–15 in the Online
Appendix display a selection of articles extracted from the local newspapers La
Gazzetta Del Mezzogiorno (Bari), L’Arena (Verona), Brescia Oggi (Brescia) and La
Sicilia (Palermo).
We complement the first piece of analysis with a more systematic investigation
using LexisNexis, an online media database. Ideally, we would have liked to sample
news coverage from across Italy during the study period. However, LexisNexis offers
access to only a few Italian newspapers, and that too for recent years.14 We select
two Italian newspapers available on Lexis-Nexis since January 2009, i.e. Il Giorno
13 The local newspapers include La Gazzetta Del Mezzogiorno (Bari), L’Arena (Verona), Brescia Oggi
(Brescia) and La Sicilia (Palermo). The local newspapers include Il Mattino di Napoli (Bari), Brescia Oggi
(Verona), L’Arena (Brescia) and Il secolo XIX (Palermo). The national newspaper consulted for the four
visit is Il Corriere della Sera.
14The reason appears to be that Italian newspapers have actively sought to monetise their news archives.
Most newspapers maintain a historical archive and charge a subscription fee to read past editions; the fee
depends on the number of daily issues that users wishes to access. Moreover, for the vast majority of
newspapers, the archives can be accessed on the newspaper’s website only.
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Table 7 Media coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bari Verona Brescia Palermo
Feb 1984 Oct 2006 Nov 2009 Oct 2010
Local 57 183 69 36
Non-local 2 5 1 1
National 2 10 1 3
Each entry reports the number of newspaper articles on the Pope during the week of the visit. The local
newspapers include La Gazzetta Del Mezzogiorno (Bari), L’Arena (Verona), Brescia Oggi (Brescia) and La
Sicilia (Palermo). The non-local newspapers include Il Mattino di Napoli (Bari), Brescia Oggi (Verona),
L’Arena (Brescia) and Il secolo XIX (Palermo). The national newspaper consulted for the four visits is Il
Corriere della Sera
and Il Resto del Carlino. Although these newspapers are available nationally, their
readership is locally concentrated—the former in Lombardia, and the latter in Emilia-
Romagna and Marche.
We construct a dataset of the monthly count of news articles on the Pope in the
two newspapers for the years 2009 to 2017. There are 9 papal visits to Lombardia,
Emilia-Romagna and Marche during this period. We use an event study methodol-
ogy. Specifically, we estimate a negative binomial regression model with the monthly
article count in a newspaper as the outcome of interest, and an event dummy that is
equal to 1 if the Pope visits the region where that newspaper has wide circulation. We
interact the event dummy with leads and lags so that we can trace out media response
before, during and after papal visits. The regression includes fixed effects for the
newspapers, month of year (e.g. Jan 2009), and newspaper-specific linear monthly
trends.
Figure 7 shows the estimated change in local newspaper coverage in the months
surrounding a visit. There is no detectable difference in local vs. non-local newspa-
pers coverage in the 2 months prior to the visit. Coverage spikes during the month of
the visit; the local newspaper carries on average 24 more articles on the Pope. The
effect is quite large, as this represents the 72% of the average number of articles on
the Pope. The increase in local coverage remains statistically significant until the 2nd
month after the visit before dropping back to normal.
To sum up, there appears to be a clear pattern of intensified coverage of the Pope
in the local newspapers during papal visits.15
6.2 Content of papal speeches
The content of papal speeches is typically in line with mainstream Catholic doctrine
and, as a consequence, the speeches do not provide any new information to Catholics.
15Unfortunately, we do not have information on TV and radio coverage of such events; nonetheless, it is
reasonable to expect local broadcasters to devote more time to the visit of the Pope.
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Fig. 7 Monthly leads and lags of impact on media coverage
Nonetheless, as remarked by Bassi and Rasul (2017), non-informative dimensions
of communication can influence belief formation through salience, attention and
framing.
Using the information made available by the Vatican papal archives, we study
how frequently the Pope talks about abortion. In about 25.4% of the visits, the Pope
talks about abortion explicitly or implicitly by using expressions such as “sanctity of
human life since its conception” or “protection of human life in the womb”. We also
count the mention of other plausibly relevant keywords: “family”, “sex” or “contra-
ception” and “chastity”. The Pope refers to family in approximately the 95.4% of his
visits, confirming the centrality of the family unit according to the Catholic doctrine.
The frequency is considerably lower for the other words: “sex” or “contraception”
(8.1%), and “chastity” (13.3%).
We then investigate whether the impact is larger for visits during which the Pope
talks about abortion. Table 8 shows that the estimated decline in abortions is more
than twice as large for such visits.
Another dimension of the papal visit that might matter is the intensity of his
engagement with the public. The Pope typically makes several public speeches dur-
ing a visit; the median number of speeches is 5. We re-estimate Eq. 1, separately for
visits during which the Pope made less than or more than 5 speeches. The results
presented in the Appendix A-Table 13 show that the decline in abortions is larger
following papal visits with more speeches.16
16We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the analyses of the content and frequency of papal
speeches.
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Table 8 The impact of the papal visits on abortions when the pope mentions abortion
(1) (2)
Abortion not mentioned Abortion mentioned
pre2 − 0.035 0.033
(0.028) (0.062)
pre1 0.002 − 0.010
(0.029) (0.055)
post0 − 0.010 − 0.006
(0.021) (0.054)
post1 − 0.094 − 0.129
(0.067) (0.132)
post2 − 0.081 − 0.283∗
(0.066) (0.164)
post3 − 0.130∗ − 0.277∗
(0.071) (0.157)
post4 − 0.133 − 0.215
(0.092) (0.154)
post5 0.010 − 0.118
(0.022) (0.093)
N 12,720 12,720
R2 0.876 0.877
No. of visits 129 44
Province FE Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes
Prov. quarterly trends Yes Yes
Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the provincial level
6.3 Impact on religiosity
We have argued that papal visits heighten the stigma attached to abortions. We now
present evidence that papal visits have an impact on religiosity, using the repeated
cross-section annual survey Aspects of daily life made publicly available by the
Italian National Institute of Statistics. The survey interviews every year a sample
of 20,000 Italian households (roughly corresponding to 50,000 individuals) on key
aspects of daily life and behaviour. The sampling strategy follows a two-stage strat-
ification aimed at constructing a sample representative at the national, macro-area
(North-West, North-East, Centre, South and Isles) and regional level.
From 1993 to 2003, the data were collected during the month of November, while
starting from 2005, it was run in February. The survey did not take place in 2004. The
survey explores multiple facets of daily life such as respondents’ religious, political
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and social participation, allowing us to conduct the analysis at the regional level,
corresponding to NUTS-2 regions according to the European Union classification. In
total, there are 20 regions with each region made up of multiple provinces.17,18
We focus our analysis on women and exploit the section on religious participation,
where individuals are asked to report the frequency of church attendance, and gener-
ate a binary indicator taking the value 1 if the respondent reports going to church at
least once a week and 0 otherwise.19
We estimate the following linear probability specification:
Yi,r,y = β1Pope0−3r,y +β2Pope4−16r,y + δXi,r,y +γr × t + ιr × t2 + θr + θy +ui,r,y (2)
where Yi,r,y is an indicator for weekly church attendance for respondent i in region r
in year y; Xi,r,y includes individual-level observable characteristics such as age, edu-
cation, gender, unemployment status and marital status; γr × t and ιr × t2 are regional
yearly trends, θr and θy are region and year fixed effects. The variables Pope0−3r,y and
Pope4−16r,y are event dummies. The former, Pope0−3r,y , takes the value 1 if the respon-
dent was surveyed within 3 months of a papal visit to the respondent’s region. The
latter, Pope4−16r,y , takes the value 1 if the papal visit took place 4 to 16 months prior to
the date of survey. Thus, β1 and β2 aim to capture the short-run and the more long-run
effects of the papal visit on church attendance.
We estimate Eq. 2 for the full sample and, separately, for women and men. Table 9
displays the results. Women show a significant increase in the frequency of church
attendance following a papal visit. However, this increase does not appear to persist
beyond 3 months after the papal visit. On the contrary, no effect is detected for men.20
The findings on increased church attendance are consistent with the findings
on reduced abortions, and support heightened religiosity as a potential mechanism.
However, the drop in abortions persists for up to 14 months after a papal visit but we
do not see a corresponding persistence in the increase in religiosity. We are unable to
offer a fully satisfactory explanation for the duration of the behavioural change driv-
ing the fall in abortions. We do note though that there is considerable measurement
error in estimating Eq. 2 since the event dummies are constructed at the regional
level, and regions are amalgamations of several provinces. We would expect the coef-
ficients to be biased towards 0. Additionally, there is evidence that the effects of
participating in major religious events can be salient for several months; Clinging-
smith et al. (2009) find significant effects on religious practices and social attitudes
of Muslim pilgrims, 5 to 8 months after participating in the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca.
17The regions exert legislative power on matters not expressly reserved to state law. Regions are made of
several provinces, with the only exception of Aosta Valley, where the provincial functions are fulfilled by
the regional government.
18The survey Aspects of daily life incorporates two regions, Piedmont and Aosta Valley, in a unique
administrative body.
19The precise question asked is, “How often do you go to the Church or other place of worship?” The
respondent can pick from two options: (1) at least once a week, or (2) less than once a week.
20In the Appendix A-Table 14, we test whether the differential effect for married and unmarried is statis-
tically significant. We do so by re-estimating Eq. 2 while pooling the two groups and interacting the event
dummies with a dummy for marital status. We cannot reject the null of no difference in effects for married
and unmarried.
E. Farina, V. Pathania
Table 9 The impact of the papal visits on religiosity
(1) (2) (3)
Total sample Women Men
Panel A: All
Pope Event0−3 0.004 0.011∗∗ − 0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Pope Event4−16 − 0.002 − 0.001 − 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.333 0.418 0.243
N 828,900 426,164 402,736
R2 0.090 0.075 0.044
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Regional yearly trends Yes Yes Yes
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
Results of OLS regressions of a dummy for weekly church attendance on indicators for papal visits 0–3
and 4–16 months before the survey response on church attendance. Individual weights provided by ISTAT
were applied. Controls include age, marital status, gender (column 1), education level and unemployment
status. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region-year level
7 Discussion
To recap, we find a large and statistically significant decrease in abortions, ranging
from − 10 to − 20%, that commences about 3 months after the papal visit and per-
sists until the 14th month. We do not find any subsequent uptick in live births. The
findings taken together suggest a strong indirect effect—papal visits induce a reduc-
tion in unintended pregnancies that starts around the time of the visits and persists for
almost 1 year. In contrast, any direct effects of restriction in demand and/or supply
of abortion appear to play limited role.
We have been agnostic whether the decrease in unintended pregnancies is being
driven by increased abstinence or increased usage of contraceptives; we have bun-
dled both behaviours as contraception. Despite extensive search, we were unable to
locate extant Italian household survey data that would allow us to measure how papal
visits affect the frequency of sexual intercourse or usage of contraceptives. But even
if surveys were available, one would have to be careful in interpreting behavioural
changes that would be the net effects of an increased desire for intended pregnancy
among some women and also an increased aversion to unintended pregnancy among
other women.21
21If the survey gathered information on desired fertility in the short or long run, one could in principle
condition on that, and test whether post-visit there is a fall in unintended pregnancies among women who
report not wanting another child.
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In discussing the indirect effect, two other features of Church doctrine are relevant.
First, the Church regards sexual intercourse as a sin if conducted outside sacramental
marriage, or, even within wedlock, if deprived of its procreative function. There-
fore, during and after papal visits, women might practise more abstinence unless
they are planning on getting pregnant. Note that this is separate type of stigma that
would independently drive down unintended pregnancies. Second, the Church explic-
itly discourages contraceptive usage because it breaks the connection between sex
and reproduction within marriage and encourages recreational sex out of wedlock.22
For women seeking to minimise the risk of an unintended pregnancy, this poses a
dilemma. One way out is to more abstinence. But some may opt for more usage of
contraceptives as the “lesser of two evils”. Therefore, a mix of both behaviours—
more abstinence and more contraceptive usage—may be driving the reduction in
unintended pregnancies.
Thus far, we have assumed that all women have the chance to modify their
behaviour in response to papal visits. But there is also a group of women who would
have gotten pregnant before the papal visit became salient, and detected the (unin-
tentional) pregnancy shortly before or after the visit. Faced with an increased cost of
abortion, some women who would have chosen to abort might opt not to do so. We
would then expect to see a contemporaneous drop in abortion, albeit smaller than the
subsequent decline, and a spike in births 9 months later. But we find no such effects.
It appears that, if already pregnant, papal visits do not change women’s abortion deci-
sions. In other words, even the heightened cost of abortion is less than the cost of an
unwanted birth. Looking back at the model in Section 4 (and Table 4), we can infer
that among women who choose to abort, most are type II (always-aborters) and only
a few are type III (switchers). Earlier, we had drawn the same inference from the lack
of increase in births reported in Section 5.2. It is worth noting that the proportion of
switchers is endogenous to the change in the cost of abortion; the greater the increase,
the higher that proportion. The fact that switchers form only a small proportion sug-
gests that the heightened stigma of abortion from papal visits is not sufficiently large
to induce women to switch away from abortions, conditional on being pregnant.
Could our findings be driven by under-reporting?23 Stigma could drive women
to switch to “back-street” abortion providers to keep the procedure secret. We can-
not rule out under-reporting as a factor but it is unlikely to be the main explanation
for our findings. With under-reporting, one would expect to see a drop in abortions
contemporaneous with the papal visit.
How do our findings compare to those reported in the recent paper by Bassi and
Rasul (2017) on the effect of the papal visit to Brazil in 1991? Their methodology is
different from ours. For identification, they exploit the fortuitous timing of the 1991
DHS survey in Brazil which was fielded in the weeks before, during and after the
22In the Encyclical Letter Humanae Vitae, Paul VI (n.d.) in reference to contraceptives states that “human
beings - and especially the young, who are so exposed to temptation - need incentives to keep the moral
law, and it is an evil thing to make it easy for them to break that law”.
23The share of illegal abortions in Italy is non-trivial although it has fallen over time. According to
Grandolfo et al. (2009), illegal abortions in 1983 accounted for about 30% of total voluntary pregnancy
terminations. The figures released by the Ministry of Health (2017) confirm a decrease in the share of
illegal abortions, estimated to be under 14% in 2012.
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papal visit. They study how short-run beliefs and long-run behaviour of individuals
respond to the papal persuasion. They report a substantial increase in the frequency of
sexual intercourse, and a large reduction in the use of contraceptives among women
interviewed post-visit. The net effect is a 26% increase in the frequency of unpro-
tected sex that drives a positive fertility response with a spike in births 9 months
post-visit. In contrast, in the Italian setting, we find no net effect on births. One plau-
sible explanation for the difference is that a papal visit to Brazil is a much bigger
event because it is so rare. This could have much larger effects on the perceived costs
of abortion as well as on fertility preferences of Brazilian women.
As already noted, abortion ratios are highest among teenagers (see Table 2). We
test how teen abortions respond to papal visits. The findings are reported in the
Appendix A-Table 15. The effect on abortions is smaller for teenagers; there is a
statistically significant decline of about 10% in the third quarter following the visit
but no significant declines in other periods. We also test for the impact separately
by age group, education level and marital status. The results are summarised in
Appendix A, Figs. 9, 10 and 11. In general, the effects appear similar across groups
except for a few differences. The decline appears to be larger for married women than
for unmarried ones, and to a lesser degree, for less educated women versus higher
educated ones. The finding of smaller effects for unmarried women is not surpris-
ing given what we find for teens, who likely make up a big part of the unmarried
group. However, when we use pooled regressions to explicitly test whether the differ-
ence between married versus unmarried is statistically significant, we cannot reject
the null of similar sized effects. The same is true for the difference by education
level.
7.1 Is there a pattern to papal visits?
We ask whether papal visits are planned in response to underlying trends in abortions
or religiosity. The concern is that if the Pope is more likely to visit provinces that are
exhibiting a trend of relatively increasing religiosity (and concurrently a decreasing
relative abortion rate), our estimate of the impact is not ‘causal’ but merely reflects
this underlying trend.
First, we note that our identification strategy relies on the precise timing of the
event, and in the preferred specifications, we control for province-specific quadratic
time trends. Reassuringly, we find no discernible effect in the quarters (or months)
preceding the event. Hence, we would argue that our estimates can be credibly
inferred as causal.
Nevertheless, the time and place of a papal visit are unlikely to be random.24 The
decision made by the Pope to visit a place could be driven by specific factors, e.g.
24In fact, most papal visits are planned well in advance. See for example the article by the Archdiocese
of Baltimore (n.d.) at the following link: https://www.archbalt.org/planning-papal-trips-takes-diplomacy-
collaboration-fine-tuning/.
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Table 10 Factors influencing the papal visits
(1) (2) (3)
Pr(Pope Event=1)
%Δ1 Abortionsp,y−1 − 0.002
(0.003)
%Δ2 Abortionsp,y−1 0.007
(0.006)
%Δ5 Abortionsp,y−1 0.000
(0.002)
N 3146 3037 2823
R2 0.147 0.178 0.183
%Δ1 Birthsp,y−1 0.058
(0.069)
%Δ2 Birthsp,y−1 − 0.003
(0.072)
%Δ5 Birthsp,y−1 0.016
(0.050)
N 2,969 2,859 2,850
R2 0.140 0.157 0.161
%Δ1 Religiosityr,y−1 −0.259
(0.222)
%Δ2 Religiosityr,y−1 −0.090
(0.351)
%Δ5 Religiosityr,y−1 − 0.459
(0.288)
N 285 266 228
R2 0.373 0.352 0.396
Province or region FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Prov. or region yearly trends Yes Yes Yes
Prov. or region visited before Yes Yes Yes
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by ** and at the 1% level by ***.
Results of OLS regressions of a dummy for papal visits to a province (region) in a given year on preceding
trends in abortions (panel A), births (panel B) and religiosity (panel C). Controls include a dummy =1
if the province (region) was visited in the 1, 2 or 5 years preceding the visit, province (region) and year
fixed effects and provincial (regional) yearly trends. Robust standard errors are clustered at the provincial
(regional) level
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Table 11 The impact of the papal visits on abortions (years 1997 and 1998 excluded)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(abortions)
pre2 − 0.016 − 0.021 − 0.013 − 0.016
(0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024)
pre1 0.005 0.000 0.001 − 0.004
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
post0 − 0.007 − 0.015 − 0.006 − 0.014
(0.025) (0.020) (0.025) (0.019)
post1 − 0.110∗ − 0.119∗∗ − 0.105∗ − 0.113∗
(0.061) (0.059) (0.062) (0.059)
post2 − 0.139∗∗ − 0.147∗∗ − 0.135∗∗ − 0.142∗∗
(0.067) (0.064) (0.067) (0.064)
post3 − 0.163∗∗ − 0.167∗∗ − 0.168∗∗ − 0.173∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
post4 − 0.163∗∗ − 0.160∗∗ − 0.164∗∗ − 0.162∗∗
(0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078)
post5 − 0.036 − 0.030 − 0.034 − 0.026
(0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027)
N 11,896 11,896 11,896 11,896
R2 0.805 0.873 0.805 0.873
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes No No
Calendar quarter FE Yes Yes No No
Quarter FE No No Yes Yes
Prov. yearly trends No Yes No No
Prov. quarterly trends No No No Yes
Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗ and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the provincial level
motivated by the desire to reverse a general decline in religiosity among the local
population that leads to an increasing abortion rate. If so, a papal visit may coincide
with other (unobserved) ongoing activities by the Church in that province and during
that time that could be driving our results.
We test whether the Pope is more likely to visit a province or region that exhibits
an increase in the number of abortions or a decrease in the number of births or in the
level of religiosity in the 1, 2 or 5 years preceding the papal event, using the following
specification:
Pr(Pope Eventp,y = 1) = α+β%ΔiZp,y−1+γp × t +δp × t2+θp +θa +up,y (3)
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Fig. 8 Monthly leads and lags of impact on abortions (provinces never visited excluded)
where Pope Eventp,y is a binary indicator taking the value 1 if province p was vis-
ited by the Pope in year y; %ΔiZp,y−1 represents the percentage change in the
number of abortions, births or in the average religiosity indicator, as defined in
Section 6.3, over the 1, 2 or 5 years preceding the visit of the Pope in province p,
γp × t and δp × t2 are provincial yearly trends; θp and θy are province and year fixed
effects.25
Table 10 displays the results from estimating Eq. 3. Starting from panel A, the
papal visits do not respond to any pre-trend in the number of abortions registered
in the 1, 2 or 5 years preceding the visit to a specific province. We repeat the same
exercise to test whether the papal visits are influenced by changes in births (panel
B) or religiosity (panel C). Also, in these cases, no statistically significant effect is
detected. Overall, the results bolster confidence that our main findings are causal
effects of papal visits and not merely picking up underlying trends in local religiosity
and Church activities.
7.2 Additional tests
As a first test, we re-estimate Eq. 1 for abortions excluding the years 1997–1998. We
do so because the analysis of live births does not include those years (see Section 3,
25 The analysis on religiosity is conducted at the regional level, as explained in Section 6.3.
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Table 12 The impact of the papal visits on abortions by gestational age
(1) (2)
≤ 90 days > 90 days
pre2 − 0.016 0.037
(0.024) (0.046)
pre1 − 0.002 − 0.015
(0.023) (0.067)
post0 − 0.010 − 0.039
(0.018) (0.056)
post1 − 0.107∗ − 0.030
(0.057) (0.042)
post2 − 0.139∗∗ − 0.015
(0.064) (0.048)
post3 − 0.174∗∗∗ − 0.026
(0.066) (0.047)
post4 − 0.159∗∗ − 0.016
(0.077) (0.046)
post5 − 0.029 0.012
(0.028) (0.050)
N 12,720 12,720
R2 0.875 0.734
Province FE Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes
Prov. quarterly trends Yes Yes
Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗ and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the provincial level
p. 11). As shown in Table 11, the results for abortion remain essentially unchanged
(compare with Table 5). Second, we re-estimate Eq. 1 for monthly abortion counts
excluding provinces that were never visited by the Pope. Again, as shown in Fig. 8,
we get similar results to those displayed in Fig. 5.
Finally, we would not expect abortions induced for medical reasons to be substan-
tially affected by papal visits. The data does not explicitly identify such abortions.
However, legally, any abortions after the foetus is 3 months old can only be
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performed on medical grounds. We know the age of the foetus at the time of abor-
tion. In Table 12. we show the impact on abortions for foetus aged less than 3 months
(largely voluntary) and those aged more than 3 months (medically necessary). The
latter serves as a placebo test—there is no impact on such abortions.
8 Conclusions
We find that papal visits to Italian provinces cause a 10 to 20% decline in the num-
ber of abortions, starting in the 3rd month after the visit and persisting until around
the 14th month after. We argue that the decline in abortions is being primarily driven
by a reduction in unintended pregnancies. We offer two main pieces of evidence for
this explanation. First, the timing of the effect—the drop in abortions is not contem-
poraneous with papal visits. Instead, abortions start decreasing about 3 months after
the visit which would approximately coincide with the timing of abortions for unin-
tended pregnancies that occur during the papal visit. Second, ceteris paribus, given
the abortion rate in Italy, the large fall in abortions would translate into a measurable
increase in the number of live births. But we fail to find any discernible increase in
live births 9 months after the visit. Taken together, the timing of the effect and the
lack of an increase in births point towards a decline in unintended pregnancies as the
most plausible explanation.
The Church has consistently maintained a strong stance against abortion. This is
well known and a papal visit does not provide new information on the stigma attached
to abortion. But the visit can make this stigma salient and thereby increase the per-
ceived cost of abortion. We furnish a number of pieces of supporting evidence. First,
papal visits generate intense local media coverage. Second, the measured impact
on abortions is larger when the Pope mentions abortion, and also when he more
actively engages with the public, as proxied by the number of public speeches during
a visit. Third, the visits lead to heightened religiosity, as proxied by weekly church
attendance.
We document that papal visits have large effects that persist for several months.
Our preferred explanation points to major behavioural changes among women (and
couples in general) lasting for almost a year. Our findings contribute to the grow-
ing literature that demonstrates the powerful role that religion continues to play in
people’s lives.
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Appendix A
Table 13 The impact of the papal visits on abortions by number of speeches
(1) (2)
Speeches < 5 Speeches ≥ 5
pre2 − 0.033 0.004
(0.034) (0.038)
pre1 − 0.023 0.029
(0.037) (0.024)
post0 − 0.026 0.011
(0.029) (0.024)
post1 − 0.084 − 0.126
(0.062) (0.117)
post2 − 0.047 − 0.253∗
(0.061) (0.130)
post3 − 0.105 − 0.251∗∗
(0.065) (0.124)
post4 − 0.063 − 0.268∗
(0.064) (0.147)
post5 − 0.002 − 0.051
(0.031) (0.049)
N 12,720 12,720
R2 0.876 0.877
Province FE Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes
Prov. quarterly trends Yes Yes
Significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗ and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the provincial level
Papal visits and abortions: evidence from Italy
Table 14 The impact of the papal visits on religiosity (differential effect by marital status)
(1) (2) (3)
Total sample Women Men
Pope Event0−3 × Married − 0.013 − 0.023 0.001
(0.021) (0.023) (0.016)
Pope Event4−16 × Married 0.004 0.003 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
N 828,900 426,164 402,736
R2 0.090 0.075 0.044
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Regional Yearly Trends Yes Yes Yes
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by ** and at the 1% level by ***. Results
of OLS regressions of a dummy for weekly church attendance on indicators for papal visits 0–3 and
4–16 months before the survey response on church attendance, interacted with the marital status of the
respondent (the unmarried are the excluded category). Individual weights provided by ISTATwere applied.
Controls include age, gender (column 1), education level and unemployment status. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the region-year level
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Table 15 The impact of the papal visits on abortions for teenage women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(abortions)
pre2 0.017 − 0.011 0.014 − 0.013
(0.032) (0.026) (0.033) (0.028)
pre1 0.014 −0.012 0.021 −0.006
(0.034) (0.033) (0.036) (0.035)
post0 0.006 − 0.020 0.011 − 0.015
(0.034) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032)
post1 − 0.019 − 0.051 − 0.017 − 0.046
(0.039) (0.034) (0.037) (0.032)
post2 0.006 − 0.024 0.006 − 0.023
(0.040) (0.034) (0.040) (0.035)
post3 − 0.080∗∗ − 0.104∗∗∗ − 0.079∗∗ − 0.105∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036)
post4 − 0.029 − 0.044 − 0.024 − 0.040
(0.049) (0.047) (0.048) (0.046)
post5 0.004 − 0.016 0.008 − 0.007
(0.037) (0.031) (0.037) (0.031)
N 12,720 12,720 12,720 12,720
R2 0.782 0.855 0.788 0.861
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes No No
Calendar Quarter FE Yes Yes No No
Quarter FE No No Yes Yes
Prov. yearly trends No Yes No No
Prov. quarterly trends No No No Yes
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by ** and at the 1% level by ***. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the provincial level
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Fig. 9 Monthly leads and lags of impact on abortions by age category
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Fig. 10 Monthly leads and lags of impact on abortions by marital status
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Fig. 11 Monthly leads and lags of impact on abortions by educational status
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Appendix B
Fig. 12 Papal Visits to Bari (February 1984)
E. Farina, V. Pathania
Fig. 13 Papal Visits to Verona (October 2006)
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Fig. 14 Papal Visits to Brescia (November 2009)
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Fig. 15 Papal Visits to Palermo (October 2010)
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